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Abstract 
Hate crimes against dissident groups are on the rise in Turkey, and political hate speech 
might have a triggering effect on this trend. In this study, the relationship between political 
hate speech against the Gulen Movement and the hate crimes perpetrated by ordinary people 
was examined through semi-structured interviews and surveys with victims. The findings 
suggest that a rise in political hate rhetoric targeting a given group might result in a 
corresponding rise in hate crimes committed against them, the effects of which have been 
largely overlooked in the current literature in the evolving Turkish context. 
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Introduction 
Hate speech used by some politicians against certain ethnic, religious, or political groups has in recent 
years become part of an increasing number of political campaigns and rhetoric (Amnesty International 
2017). Although there are few universally acknowledged definitions of hate speech, any offensive 
communication targeting the dignity or reputation of a given group or individual is considered as such 
(Bakircioglu 2008). When inflammatory statements from political leaders targeting a group become their 
political rhetoric, this does not fall on deaf ears. Widely publicized statements made by politically powerful 
individuals fan the flames of hate crimes, inciting members of the general public to victimize so-called 
“enemies” in a target group (Perry 2001). 
 
A recent report revealed that hate crimes reported to police in the United States (US) reach their peak 
during election campaigns (Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism 2018; Williams 2018). Similarly, 
racially and religiously motivated hate crimes and online hate speech against minorities, specifically 
Muslims and refugees, spiked during the recent Brexit vote, which saw the general public of the United 
Kingdom (UK) vote to withdraw from the European Union (HateLab 2020a, 2020b). A possible reason for 
this might be the increasingly discriminating and targeting rhetoric used by candidates during elections 
and the subsequent rise in hate crimes that occur throughout campaigns—hence, suggesting the parallels 
between the two. However, pure statistics tell us very little about the nature of the hate crime process as 
fueled by the political atmosphere (Perry 2001). According to Walters, Brown, and Wiedlitzka (2016), 
theories in social psychology suggest that prejudiced attitudes toward the victim group and perceptions 
of threat correlate with the tendency to commit hate crimes. However, they concluded that lacking 
evidence shows how those attitudes and perceptions are shaped and how the mechanisms that lead to 
hate crimes operate. 
 
By analyzing victims’ perspectives, the current study examines whether and how the inflammatory 
rhetoric of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and members of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) has fueled hate crimes against members of the Gulen (or Hizmet) Movement, a transnational 
religious civil society group. Using Perry’s (2001) “doing difference” theoretical framework, the study 
focuses on the ongoing political hate rhetoric in Turkey and how this language affects interactions between 
proponents of the current government and the targeted group. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Perry’s (2001: 185) “doing difference” theory posits “political discourse reaffirms and legitimates the 
negative evaluations of difference that give rise to hate crime.” Essentially, she depicts hate crimes as 
instruments for “intimidation and control” (2001: 2), which dominant groups use to reconstruct their 
authority and remind victims of their boundaries and limits. When the subordinate groups “step outside” 
(2001: 2) their boundaries constructed for them by the dominant group, they are perceived as a threat to 
authority. Thus, the power of the hegemonic group needs to be “reaffirmed” (2001: 54), and hate crimes 
provide both the tools for that process and a response to the perceived threat posed by so-called 
subordinates. In addition, Perry (2001) argues that the practices, policy, and rhetoric of a state that 
stigmatizes, demonizes, or marginalizes a subordinate group provide a formal context in which hate crimes 
can and do emerge. In that sense, hate crimes incited by state-level rhetoric serve as “an informal 
mechanism of control” (2001: 179). One such mechanism is discourse that depicts “others” as “different,” 
deviant, dangerous, and/or inferior, unlocking the “permission to hate” and further legitimating hate 
crimes and mistreatment against certain oppressed groups. 
 
To further explain how political rhetoric creates a climate that legitimates hate crimes, van Dijk’s (2006) 
manipulative discourse thesis can be used. While all political speech attempts to condition public action 
through various techniques of persuasion and manipulation (David 2014; Rozina and Karapetjana 2009), 
politicians tend to use the latter, in particular, to mobilize their proponents and act in “the best interest of 
the dominated group and against the best interests of dominated groups” (van Dijk 2006: 359). Thus, 
manipulative discourse aims to control people’s beliefs, opinions, ideologies, and actions through abuses 
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of social power and domination (van Dijk 2006). Political hate speech can, then, be examined in this 
framework—first, to indicate whether politicians may use their power to disseminate their fears and 
hatred of targeted dissidents to the general public; and subsequently whether political hate rhetoric may 
mobilize members of the public to commit hate crimes against the targeted group in support of their 
dominant counterpart. 
 
The daily conduct of hate speech, when combined with the social reach and influence of politicians, may 
create devastating effects on its victims (Benesch et al. 2020). When hate speech becomes the element of 
daily political discourse, its effect and harm may well go beyond the targeted group or individual(s) 
(Roberts 1995). By enabling hate crimes to occur against supposedly threatening groups using 
increasingly insulting language, they are alleged as inferior and deserving of this hostility (Poynting and 
Perry 2007). 
 
For example, the genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 provides a striking case of how political 
rhetoric against a group led to devastating outcomes. Decades of propaganda and demonization against 
Tutsis via a public radio station incited Hutus against the Tutsi minority (Ndahiro 2019). Politicians had 
been using anti-Tutsi rhetoric to rally voters when the party lost support and reached a dangerous level in 
the years preceding genocide, such that politicians publicly provoked their supporters into the mass 
murder of Tutsis and into dumping their bodies in a river (CBC 2001). As a result of this rhetoric, people 
turned against their fellow citizens, neighbors, and even peers at school, and 800,000 people were killed 
in only 100 days (BBC 2019). 
 
The case of the Gulen Movement in Turkey has not yet turned into the genocide observed in Rwanda. 
However, the ongoing hate rhetoric used by President Erdogan and other top government officials, as well 
as a rise in the prevalence of hate crimes against the group, have reached a critical point in recent years. 
To better understand the hate-related victimization in Turkey today, we must acknowledge the recent 
history of hate crimes and political hate rhetoric plaguing the country. 
 
Hate Crimes in Turkey 
 
The term “hate crime” is relatively new in Turkey, despite its presence in the country’s history (Kazaz 
2016). As a legal concept, the term did not appear on the public agenda until the murder of Armenian 
journalist and activist Hrant Dink in 2006 (Göktan 2017). Since then, hate crimes have been used and 
discussed more frequently in the Turkish media as well as in academic literature and by the general public. 
Importantly, hate crimes were not defined as a separate type of crime in the Turkish Criminal Code (TCC) 
until 2014. Changes made to Article 122 of the TCC saw hatred and discrimination now described as 
occurring if one’s actions prevented people from economic activities, being hired for a job, or enjoying 
public services due to their ethnic, religious, or political differences, made punishable with one to three 
years’ imprisonment. Despite this change, Article 122 has been criticized for being far from enforceable in 
practice due to its language usage and narrow definition of hate crimes. Notably, the most common types 
of hate crime—that being both physical and verbal attacks—were not included in the TCC. Besides, there 
has been no conviction based on Article 122 since the crime was legally defined (Kazaz 2016; Nupel Haber 
2019). 
 
Over the course of the modern Turkish Republic (1920–2020), almost every elected government has 
created hegemony and a host of victims, and in almost all periods politicians have used hate speech against 
their opponents (Akpinar 2015). The victimization of minorities and political rivals in Turkey was not 
solely limited to being the target of political hate speech, but the hatred toward these groups also 
frequently sparked massive purges and persecution. Depending on the ideology of the leading party or 
power, various groups have been targeted in different periods. Among the victimized groups have been 
ethnic minorities (i.e., Kurds, Armenians, Caucasians, Laz, Romans, and Arabs); religious minorities (i.e., 
Jews, Orthodox Christians, Assyrians, Ezidis, Alawites, and Jafaris); Muslim groups, sects, and movements; 
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LGBTQ communities; and recently Syrian refugees whose population has exceeded three million in Turkey 
since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011 (Connor 2018; Göktan 2017). 
 
Göktan (2017) argued that in addition to the official attitude toward certain minority groups, personal bias 
and prejudice as well as unfair media scrutiny have encouraged further victimization of select groups. A 
recent report by the Hrant Dink Foundation (HDF 2018) revealed that 5,296 articles that include hate and 
discriminatory speech were published in the Turkish press in 2017. Among these, 6,782 hate speech 
examples were found against 79 different racial, national, or religious groups. The country has also 
witnessed some outrageous hate crimes against members of different minorities. The victims of some of 
the most notorious hate crime incidents in recent times include Andrea Santoro, a Roman Catholic priest 
who was shot and killed in 2006; a gay journalist who was stabbed to death in 2006; Hrant Dink, an 
Armenian journalist and human rights activist who was murdered in front of his newspaper building in 
2007; four bible publishing company workers at Zirve Publishing who were murdered in 2007 by an 
ultranationalist group known as Ergenekon; and Tahir Elci, a Kurdish human rights lawyer and activist 
who was shot dead in broad daylight in 2015 (Arslan 2011; Göktan 2017). 
 
A common motivation in these recent cases was the rising hate rhetoric used against victims and/or 
victimized groups. For example, Tahir Elci and Hrant Dink had been increasingly and publicly targeted on 
the grounds of their ethnic and political identity up until their murders (Arslan 2011; Nupel Haber 2019). 
Two years before Dink was killed by the Ergenekon ultranationalist group (Arslan 2011), he wrote a 
column in which he alleged that the first Turkish female pilot, Sabiha Gokcen—a symbolic name in the 
history of the modern Turkish Republic and foster child of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—was actually Armenian 
(Er 2015). Soon after, the Turkish General Staff declared Dink’s allegation to be unhealthy, irresponsible, 
and dangerous. Until his murder in 2006, the explicit insults and threats continued to target him in the 
right-wing, conservative, and even mainstream media outlets, and he was accused of being a tool of 
imperialism, a traitor, and a collaborator with those powers who want to divide the country (Goktas 2009). 
The hatred against Dink did not stop after his death. Even recently, his wife, Rakel Dink, and the human 
rights organization founded under his name, the Hrant Dink Foundation, continue to receive hateful e-
mails including death threats and hate speech (HDF 2020). 
 
Similarly, the murder of Kurdish lawyer and activist Tahir Elci happened two months after he appeared on 
a television program on CNN Turk, where he was asked if he thought that the PKK was a terrorist 
organization. Responding negatively to the question, and believing the PKK to be an armed political 
organization that has large public support and that had at times committed terrorist acts, Elci was 
increasingly targeted and exposed to public hate speech; thereafter, he was taken into custody and 
forbidden to go abroad after his release (Human Rights Watch 2015). Elsewhere, rising anti-Christianity 
in Turkey was a key reason behind Roman Catholic priest Andrea Santoro’s murder. Immediately 
following, Bishop Luigi Padovese, who was also serving in Turkey, warned the public about rising anti-
Christian propaganda in the country during a media interview (Allen 2006). Later in 2010, Bishop 
Padovese was stabbed to death by his driver, who had announced that he had killed the ‘great Satan’ 
(Squires 2010: para. 1). 
 
Hate Crimes Against the Gulen Movement 
Since the outbreak of a corruption scandal in late 2013 that implicated some cabinet ministers and family 
members of President Erdogan (Arango et al. 2013), a new chapter has been opened in Turkey’s history of 
hatred. Erdogan declared the investigations as an attempted coup against his government despite solid 
evidence on the schemes. The investigators and prosecutors conducting the probes were dismissed from 
their positions and some were arrested soon after the investigation. President Erdogan declared “all-out 
war” on the Gulen Movement, given its origins as a transnational religious civil society group inspired by 
Fethullah Gulen (a Muslim cleric now living in self-exile in the US), blaming them for plotting the 
corruption probes (Ozeren, Cubukcu, and Bastug 2020). Since then, the president’s political rhetoric has 
increasingly targeted members of the Movement (Stockholm Center for Freedom [SCF] 2017). Erdogan’s 
severity took the form of outright demonization and vilification of the Movement in the aftermath of the 
Barbara Perry, Davut Akca, Fatih Karakus, Mehmet F Bastug: Planting Hate Speech to Harvest Hatred 
 
 
IJCJ&SD       5 
www.crimejusticejournal.com   
failed coup attempt in July 2016. Although he blamed the group for plotting the corruption probes and the 
coup attempt, Gulenists have explicitly denied their involvement in both efforts (BBC 2014; Saul 2016). It 
was reported that Erdogan used some 240 different concepts to insult the Gulen Movement since the 
investigations were conducted (SCF 2017). In his address to the nation after the 2016 coup attempt, the 
president depicted informing on Gulen supporters as a “patriotic duty,” encouraging citizens to become 
voluntary informants that spy on their coworkers, neighbors, relatives, and even family members 
(TurkeyPurge 2016). 
 
During this period, the Gulen Movement has also been publicly targeted by ordinary people, prompting 
thousands of group members to leave Turkey due to ever-increasing demonization and seek asylum in 
Western countries (Advocates of Silenced Turkey 2017). Those who could not leave have become targets 
of violent hate crimes. For example, inspired and motivated by the ongoing political hate rhetoric, a 
research assistant at Osmangazi University killed four of his colleagues in the faculty in 2018 for being 
alleged Gulen members (Fox and Alam 2018). The murder suspect had previously lodged complaints about 
102 academics with “FETO” (a derogatory term used by the AKP government while referring to the Gulen 
Movement) membership accusations (which led to their dismissal from academic positions) and in his first 
statement in police custody claimed to have felt no repentance for his act (Akca 2018). This case has raised 
many questions about the devastating effect of political hate rhetoric and whether it fuels hate crimes 
among the Turkish populace. 
 
Current Research 
 
This study examined through victim perspectives the relationship between politicians’ hate speech against 
the Gulen Movement and the hate crimes committed by ordinary people. We assessed whether 
participants were victimized more frequently after the corruption probes and the coup attempt in Turkey, 
and analyzed victims’ perceptions on whether political hate speech is a factor that motivates the hate crime 
perpetrators. In addition, this study explored how hate crimes influenced one’s daily life practices and 
social interactions. 
 
Method 
 
A mixed-method sequential explanatory design was used. This meant that the findings underwent a 
qualitative phase following the collection and analysis of quantitative data. The latter process provides a 
general understanding of the research problem through statistical analysis, whereas the former helps to 
refine and explain the findings by exploring participants’ views in greater depth (Ivankova, Creswell, and 
Stick 2006). In the first step, surveys were conducted with 99 members of the Gulen Movement who had 
recently left Turkey and immigrated to Canada due to fear of and actual persecution. Next, the survey 
results were explored through semi-structured interviews with 10 participants. 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Ninety-nine individuals who immigrated to Canada from Turkey participated in this study. Participants 
were recruited from the Turkish population living in the Greater Toronto Area and self-identified as a 
member or supporter of the Gulen Movement. A snowball sampling method was used to select 
participants, of whom the initial few were found through the researchers’ personal network and 
subsequently asked to refer other potential individuals to participate. Data collection occurred between 
March 2018 and January 2019. 
 
Of the 150 group members approached, 66 completed the survey online and 33 filled out the paper survey. 
The vast majority of respondents immigrated to Canada from Turkey within the last two years before the 
data collection date, with 96% reporting a very strong or strong sense of belonging to the Movement. Table 
1 shows the descriptive statistics detailing participants’ demographic characteristics. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Demographic Variables 
 
Variable f p Variable f p 
Gender   Length of residence   
Male 68 68.7% Less than six months 41 42.3% 
Female 31 31.3% 6–12 months 27 27.8% 
Age   13–24 months 23 23.7% 
18–29 12 12.3% More than 24 months 6 6% 
30–39  36 37.5% Sense of belonging   
40–49 44 45.9% Very strong 71 71.7% 
50–59 2 2.1% Strong 24 24.2% 
60 or older 2 2.1% Moderate 0 0% 
   Weak 3 3% 
   Very weak 1 1% 
 
 
Following the survey, respondents were asked if they would like to participate for interview. Ten 
participants volunteered to be interviewed in person and audio-recorded with consent. 
 
Instruments 
The survey and interview guides used in this study were adapted with permission from an ongoing 
research project (see Helly et al. 2018) examining hate crimes against Muslims in Canada. In the survey, 
participants were asked how frequently they experienced seven different types of hate crimes due to their 
affiliation with the Movement in three different periods: these were before the corruption probes in 2013, 
between the corruption probes and the coup attempt in July 2016, and after the coup attempt. The types 
of hate crimes related to verbal attacks, online hate crimes, property-related crimes, threats, physical 
assaults, victimization by the criminal justice system, and institutional damage. The frequency of 
victimization was assessed on a five-point, Likert-type strength-of-agreement scale, ranging from 1 
(“never”) to 5 (“very frequently”). Respondents were also asked whether they had heard or witnessed any 
of the seven types of hate crimes that may have been inflicted on another group member. 
 
In the second part of the questionnaire, respondents were given a list of 50 hate phrases that President 
Erdogan used against the Gulen Movement. These were randomly selected from the 240 phrases reported 
by the SCF (2017). Then, participants were asked whether they had heard any of these expressions from 
people other than the President or a politician. They were also asked how strongly they believed these 
hateful discourses against the Gulen Movement affected perpetrators’ behavior toward them and how 
strongly they believed that Turkish citizens decided on and changed their attitudes toward group 
members based on this rhetoric. 
 
The third part of the questionnaire was designed to measure how participants’ daily lives were affected by 
the hate crimes to which they were subjected. This section included 13 items assessing whether 
respondents took more personal security measures and whether they changed their daily routines, in turn. 
Finally, we asked whether respondents reported the hate crimes they experienced to any authority in 
Turkey and, if not, why. 
 
After gathering and analyzing the survey data, we conducted interviews with participants who were 
willing to disclose further information about their experiences. We asked about their encounters with hate 
crime and the motivations of perpetrators to elaborate on the survey findings. Specifically, we asked about 
the political ideology and/or affiliation of perpetrators, whether and how this ideology and/or affiliation 
influenced their attitude toward the participant, whether the political hate speech used by President 
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Erdogan and other politicians had any effect on perpetrators’ behavior, and how these events affected their 
daily lives and the group to which they belonged. 
 
Data Analysis 
We conducted a one-way, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the mean 
differences in the frequency of participants’ hate crime experiences during three time periods: these were 
before the corruption probes in 2013, between the corruption probes and the coup attempt in 2016, and 
from the coup attempt to the data collection period. Audio-recordings of the interviews were transcribed 
verbatim, and a thematic content analysis was conducted for emergent themes. 
 
Results 
 
Quantitative Findings 
A one-way, repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the null hypothesis that there was no 
change in the frequency of hate crime victimization before the corruption probes in 2013, between the 
probes and the coup attempt in 2016, and thereafter. The results in Table 2 indicate that both events had 
a significant effect on each type of hate crime. 
 
Table 2: One-way Repeated Measure ANOVA Outcomes 
 
Type of crime ANOVA 
Verbal attack Wilks’ lambda = 0.32, F(2, 93) = 100.156, p = 0.000, η² = 0.68 
Online hate crimes Wilks’ lambda = 0.38, F(2, 89) = 71.011, p = 0.000, η² = 0.61 
Property-related Wilks’ lambda = 0.48, F(2, 84) = 46.148, p = 0.000, η² = 0.52 
Threat Wilks’ lambda = 0.45, F(2, 86) = 51.773, p = 0.000, η² = 0.55 
Physical assault Wilks’ lambda = 0.67, F(2, 81) = 17.40, p = 0.000, η² = 0.30 
Criminal justice system Wilks’ lambda = 0.42, F(2, 77) = 52.407, p = 0.000, η² = 0.58 
Institutional damage Wilks’ lambda = 0.30, F(2, 85) = 97.20, p = 0.000, η² = 0.67 
ANOVA: analysis of variance 
 
 
A follow-up comparison indicated that each pair-wise difference between the three periods was significant 
for all types of hate crimes (p < 0.01). In particular, there was a significant increase in victimization 
frequency after each incident, which suggests that the participants experienced hate crimes more 
frequently (see Table 3). The largest effect was observed in verbal attacks and institutional damage. Some 
87% of participants reported that they had heard or had witnessed one or more types of hate crimes 
committed against other group members after the two events. 
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Table 3: Mean Frequency of Hate Crime Victimization in Three Different Periods 
 
Type of crime Mean victimization frequency 
 Period 1* Period 2** Period 3*** 
Verbal attack 1.91 3.17 3.88 
Online hate crimes 2.26 3.41 4.16 
Property-related 1.29 1.74 2.97 
Threat 1.38 2.25 3.14 
Physical assault 1.13 1.46 1.88 
Criminal justice system 1.30 2.15 3.25 
Institutional damage 1.55 2.92 4.09 
*Period 1: Before the corruption probes; **Period 2: From the corruption probes to the coup attempt; ***Period 3: After the coup 
attempt 
 
 
Respondents tended to agree on questions regarding the effect of political hate speech. Of note, 97% 
reported that they had heard from non-politicians one or more of the hate phrases used by politicians 
against the group, while 87% strongly or very strongly believed that the hate speech of President Erdogan 
and other politicians led perpetrators to target members. In addition, 95% of respondents strongly or very 
strongly believed that the discourse not only convinced but also negatively changed Turkish peoples’ 
attitudes toward the Gulen Movement (see Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4: Perceived Effect of Political Hate Speech on Perpetrators’ Behavior and Attitude 
 
 Very 
strong 
Strong Moderate Weak Not strong 
at all 
How strongly do you believe these words and other 
hate speech by Erdogan and other politicians against 
the Movement affected the perpetrators’ behavior 
against you? 
 
80 6 0 0 6 
How strongly do you believe that people in Turkey 
made up their minds and changed their attitude 
toward the Gulen Movement based on Erdogan’s and 
government officials’ hate speech? 
 
78 11 0 0 3 
 
 
Participants were asked whether they reported hate crime incidents to the authorities, and if not the 
reason(s) for their reluctance. As shown in Table 5, some 91% of the respondents stated that they did not 
report incidents to authorities, as the majority (35.4%) expressed fear of being targeted by the police or 
judiciary as a result (see Table 5). 
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Table 5: Reasons for Not Reporting Hate Crimes to Authorities 
 
Reasons for not reporting Frequency Percentage 
I thought that I might be targeted by the police or judiciary if I report 35 35.4 
I thought that the perpetrator might do worse things to me if I report 13 13.1 
I thought nothing will change 11 11.1 
I thought it was unnecessary 2 2 
Other 19 19.2 
 
 
In the final part of the survey, participants were asked along a 13-item inventory whether their hate crime 
victimization experiences had affected their daily lives. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Effects of Hate Crime Victimization on Lifestyle 
 
Changes in lifestyle N Percentage 
Improved home security 66 72.5 
Improved vehicle security 55 60.4 
Started to avoid walking in certain places 76 83.5 
Started to avoid attending community/cultural events 48 52.7 
Moved house/apartment 64 70.3 
Changed neighborhoods 63 70.8 
Changed children’s schools 50 54.9 
Changed jobs 27 37.4 
Changed location of business 34 44.2 
Closed business 48 58.5 
Changed how I dressed 43 51.2 
Stopped going out at night 47 56 
Stopped using public transportation 33 41.8 
 
 
Qualitative Findings 
Eight distinct themes emerged from the interviews. Five were perpetrator-related and three were victim-
related (see Table 7). 
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Table 7: Emergent Themes 
 
Themes N 
Perpetrator-related themes  
 Political hate speech as a motive 10 
 Perpetrator(s) as acquaintances 10 
 Fear of being stereotyped as a motive 8 
 Perpetrators from other political factions 7 
 Turkish State activities abroad 7 
Victim-related themes  
 Alienation from Turkish society 9 
 Disappearance of self-defence opportunities 8 
 Alienation from the Turkish community in Canada 8 
 
 
Political hate speech as a motive 
The timing of a change in perpetrators’ attitudes toward participants indicates how the rising political hate 
speech in Turkey fueled hate crimes against Movement members. In particular, all respondents believed 
that offenders were encouraged by President Erdogan’s hateful rhetoric against the group. One elder 
female interviewee who was physically assaulted by her younger brother and verbally assaulted by three 
of her siblings said (after mentioning her experiences) “whenever Erdogan started to use these words 
against Hizmet, my siblings started to behave like this [assaulting her verbally and physically].” Another 
participant mentioned that people were mobilized against the Movement specifically after attending pro-
Erdogan rallies. 
 
Respondents also mentioned the president’s use of religious rhetoric as a factor that increased the effect 
of his hate speeches, specifically on more religious AKP supporters. One participant explained this effect 
as follows: 
 
Specifically, because he [Erdogan] used religious concepts in his speeches, people thought 
that he is a religious person who regularly practices the religion. At least he used to seem 
so; he was holding the Qoran in his party rallies, [and] his daughter wears a headscarf. 
People were saying that they [the AKP] liberated the headscarf in the public sphere so that 
women could enter public offices. So, they gained the trust of religious people with these 
[actions], and when they delivered these [hate] speeches [against us] naming us infidel, 
deviant, etc., the hatred amongst the people against us was displayed through physical and 
verbal abuses. 
 
Fear of being stereotyped as a motive 
According to victims in this study, fear of being stereotyped as a Movement member was one key motive 
driving hate crimes. Eight expressed their beliefs that some perpetrators were intentionally assaulting 
them to avoid being labeled as a Gulen supporter or to prove that they were not a member of the group. 
The political environment had been so intense in Turkey that if they had not victimized them, they would 
have been labeled as a Gulenist and, thus, subjected to victimization as well. To this end, one of the 
respondents stated that he had many friends share anti-Movement posts on social media but did not 
believe they actually endorsed the content: 
 
I’ve seen such posts from several friends. However, I recognized that some of them were 
sharing such posts online due to their fear of the government. Some of them were doing this 
intentionally, by mentioning me in their posts. I did not use social media for a long time after 
those posts because I thought I could not cope with them. 
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Perpetrator(s) as acquaintances 
Without exception, all participants expressed the view that they were victimized by known acquaintances 
(i.e., family members and close friends) rather than by foreigners or strangers. This was especially true for 
those who were public officials, who said they were being targeted by their colleagues. Other participants 
told how their relatives or neighbors physically and/or verbally assaulted them after the government 
began targeting the Movement. One stated that “even though I was in the US when the coup attempt broke 
out, my old close friend found my phone number and insulted me.” Another participant told us that one of 
her friends from the Movement who was pregnant was forced by her father to divorce her husband and 
abort her baby just because her husband had ties with the group. Some of the interviewees mentioned 
having broken family ties due to the political nature of the discourse and subsequent hate crimes 
motivated, in turn. To this, one participant stated: 
 
there are hundreds of women with their kids kicked out of their parents’ homes after their 
husbands were arrested for being a member of the group. Parents [were] denied their 
children with the fear of being targeted by neighbors. 
 
Perpetrators from other political factions 
Some perpetrators were motivated regardless of their political stance. Seven respondents stated that 
although some were not supporters of President Erdogan, they were influenced by media-driven hate 
propaganda against the Movement, as it is almost completely under government control. They mentioned 
ultranationalists, secularists, and nationalists among those who committed hate crimes due to the rising 
hate rhetoric of politicians. One participant who was verbally assaulted by a colleague due to his affiliation 
with the Movement said: 
 
he [the perpetrator] was not a fan of the AKP [the ruling party]; however, since the AKP 
started to target the Hizmet Movement, he has been encouraged by the war declared by the 
AKP and did this. Otherwise, there had been nothing like this [between us] before. 
 
Turkish State activities abroad 
The majority of participants repeatedly mentioned the activities of the Turkish Embassy, consulates, and 
individuals connected to the Turkish National Intelligence Agency. They stressed the fear of being 
informed on, abducted, and brought back to Turkey by these state entities in the same manner to which 
some Movement members were subjected in select Eastern European countries such as Kosovo and 
Moldova. Abductions were one of the most significant fears cited. Whenever participants mentioned the 
Turkish authorities abroad, they also noted abductions of their fellow members by these bodies. Strikingly, 
these fears persist in Canada and the US, with almost all the respondents expressing the fear of even being 
around Turkish embassies. One participant reported that the Turkish Ambassador in Toronto established 
ties with various religious groups through donations, and then attended masjids for Friday Prayers and 
gave khutba (a sermon delivered at noon), demonizing the Gulen Movement in the eyes of other Islamic 
groups in Toronto. 
 
Another respondent mentioned his experience of being physically assaulted in Egypt, where he was 
brutally attacked by Turkish Embassy employees and his daughter’s Turkish identity card was seized 
illegally. One recalled his friend’s experience with a boss at a pizzeria in which the perpetrators threatened 
to inform Turkish intelligence agents in Montreal of his presence, and that he would be abducted and flown 
back to Turkey. In this example, the shop owner is alleged to have told the victim that Turkish intelligence 
is quite active in Montreal and that they often make “visitations” to gather information about Gulen 
supporters. One respondent stressed the ongoing threat in European countries, noting that a Turkish 
cabinet member visited Poland and gave interviews on all television channels arguing that the Movement 
members are terrorists. The respondent expressed his deep concern, asking, in response to prompts about 
daily routine, how individuals are meant to “go out in the night—how you are even going out in the daytime 
on such an occasion?” 
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Disappearance of self-defence opportunities 
Respondents mentioned the loss of opportunity and a means to defend themselves or express their ideas 
after the coup attempt. The fear of being assaulted prevented them from freely and publicly expressing 
themselves since the group became a government target. When asked about their reaction to verbal 
insults, one of the interviewees stated, “I could not even respond to the slurs.” Another explained the level 
of risk reached after the coup attempt: 
 
After the corruption probes, we could at least defend ourselves with counterarguments. 
However, after the coup attempt, we could not even talk about the innocence of the 
Movement. There were life-threatening risks. 
 
In addition, all interviewees revealed in detail how police and other authorities would have targeted them 
if they had reported the hate crimes they experienced, especially after 2016. As one explained: 
 
it was like confessing that you are a terrorist when you go to the police with such a 
complaint. Police would detain you without even informing your family for months. There 
was torture news all over the media. 
 
Similarly, one respondent stated that “after the coup attempt, there was no other public agenda. Everybody 
in society and every news channel was directed towards vilifying the movement members.” Pervasive 
media coverage targeting members of the Gulen Movement was raised as a concern and one of the reasons 
why many were victimized to such an extent that they were forced to flee the country. 
 
Alienation from Turkish society 
Nine participants mentioned that they had isolated themselves from social interactions after the coup 
attempt to avoid being a target of hate crimes and/or hate speech. Some stopped using social media for 
this reason, while most expressed the belief that the fear of being victimized was a major factor for leaving 
Turkey. Dismissal from official public positions and the closure of key institutions were mentioned as other 
indicators of exclusion and alienation from society. In addition, participants noted the struggle to secure 
employment, as no one was willing to hire them due to their connection to the Movement and after being 
dismissed from their jobs following the coup attempt. As one respondent stated: 
 
it was like the beginning of a genocide. We were forced to civic death. I knew about the 
Holocaust; I knew the apartheid. It was going in that direction. The kids were attacked by 
their teachers and classmates at school for having parents who are members of the Gulen 
Movement. 
 
Alienation from the Turkish community in Canada 
Eight participants expressed their unwillingness to interact with other Turkish communities in Canada 
and especially supporters of President Erdogan, due to the fear of being insulted or reported to the Turkish 
Embassy. Some expressed their concerns about family members whom they left behind in Turkey and the 
potential dangers that their overseas relatives could face if informed by other Turkish-Canadians to the 
authorities. Evidently, the fear of being victimized persists even in Canada, according to one interviewee: 
“They [Gulen Movement members] still fear as if they are in Turkey. They fear for their relatives in Turkey.” 
 
Some respondents expressed the fear felt among Movement members afraid of contacting the Turkish 
Embassy and consulates, believing that government employees would illegally confiscate their passports. 
They stated that there were a few incidents in which embassy workers had seized members’ passports 
when they were inside, as in “one pro-Erdogan restaurant owner in Toronto [who] openly declared that 
‘FETO’ members were not allowed in his restaurant.” 
 
All respondents were hesitant to express their thoughts when dealing with other Turks in Canada to avoid 
adverse reactions. One explained, “I do everything not to meet with anyone who is Turkish and stay away 
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from them if I didn’t know them before.” Another articulated the reluctance group members felt to contact 
the local authorities in Canada even if they are being victimized. He stated: 
 
Even though the legislation is strict here in Canada, the members [of] the Gulen Movement 
hesitate to express themselves not to cause social disturbances here. They choose to stay 
silent. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study examined two different aspects of hate crime victimization. First, we assessed the relationship 
between politicians’ growing use of hate speech against the Gulen Movement and the hate crimes 
perpetrated against members of the group. Second, the study examined the effect of hate speech and hate 
crimes on Movement members’ daily life practices and social interactions. To understand the relationship 
between political hate rhetoric and the hate crimes committed against victims, we analyzed whether the 
frequency of participants’ hate crime victimization changed after two important events occurred in 
Turkey—that being the corruption probes in 2013 and the coup attempt in 2016. In both periods, Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and top government officials used increasingly inflammatory rhetoric 
against the Gulen Movement. 
 
A significant increase in all types of hate crime victimization was noted after both occurrences. Among the 
types of hate crimes committed, the greatest increase was observed in verbal attacks and damage at 
institutions affiliated with the Movement. This parallel between rising political hate rhetoric against a 
certain group and the victimization of its members is similar to trends observed during election campaigns 
in other parts of the world—for example, in the US over the last three decades (Center for the Study of 
Hate and Extremism 2018) and in the recent Brexit vote in the UK (HateLab 2020a, 2020b). In the study 
context, the rhetoric used by President Erdogan and top government officials in Turkey stigmatized and 
demonized the Gulen Movement and, thus, created an environment in which violent hate crimes 
committed against members had emerged. 
 
To understand whether and how political hate speech motivated the perpetrators of this violence, we 
asked a sample group in semi-structured interviews about their victimization experiences. The timing of 
a change in attitude—especially among one’s acquaintances—toward group members highlights a parallel 
between a rise in hate rhetoric and hateful acts committed against group members. The combination of 
survey and interview findings (which represent the victim perspectives) suggests that offenders might 
indeed be motivated and encouraged by the increasing hate rhetoric politicians use against social groups. 
The nature of individuals’ motivation to commit violent acts stemming from political hate speech is better 
understood through the themes that emerged following discussion. In this context, political fanaticism, 
combined with politicians’ abuse of supporters’ religiosity, created a climate of intolerance and suspicion 
toward the Gulen Movement. The hateful discourse that emerged coupled with these abuses of social 
power effectively changed the opinions and actions of pro-government supporters in Turkey against group 
members. Therefore, such politically charged rhetoric had reaffirmed and legitimated “the negative 
evaluations of difference” (Perry 2001: 185) and encouraged individuals to act against the Movement to 
serve the interests of those in power (van Dijk 2006). 
 
Further, participants’ experiences suggested that the political rhetoric used against the Gulen Movement 
readied members of dominant groups in Turkey to commit or condone acts of violence. President 
Erdogan’s and the AKP government’s use of hate speech effectively divided the public into “us versus them” 
or “good versus evil,” which evoked and exploited the fears of Gulenists (Perry 2001: 185). Erdogan and 
other politicians within the AKP who denounced the Movement have especially substantial influence over 
their followers, particularly because they have been in power since 2002. Their presence in Turkey has 
been so powerful that people have even turned against their own families and friends, including their own 
children, siblings, and other relatives, in solidarity with the president. Although previous studies have 
shown that hate crimes are mostly committed by strangers, the number of cases that include 
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acquaintances is high. In one large-scale study, Chakraborti, Garland, and Hardy (2014) surveyed 1,421 
victims of hate crimes and found that 29% of all respondents were victimized by people who were known 
to them, including friends, neighbors, colleagues, or other acquaintances, whereas 49% of the perpetrators 
were strangers. In Canada, according to a Uniform Crime Reporting survey, 36% of 641 hate crime 
offenders were acquaintances or family members of the victims (Statistics Canada 2016). Likewise, all 
interviewees in this study reported that they had been victimized by people with whom they previously 
had good relations. This shows how political hate discourse could alter the attitudes of dominant group 
members toward subordinate sects, regardless of familial affiliation. 
 
Another important finding addresses how President Erdogan and the AKP have used religious rhetoric to 
mobilize their supporters. As shown, many perpetrators approved and embraced Erdogan’s hate speeches 
and even used them against Movement members for a number of reasons. First, Erdogan appealed 
religious sources to justify and strengthen his position. Second, he has been very effective in mobilizing 
the masses, which have supported him politically throughout his tenure as leader of the AKP and as 
Turkey’s president. In an analysis of hate crimes, Barka (2006) concluded that religious fanaticism that 
causes individuals to develop extreme worldviews may motivate them to perpetrate hate crimes against 
out-groups. Religiosity has become one of the “identity discourses” governments use to “do difference” and 
deem “others” as “deviant, dangerous and inferior” (Perry 2001: 180). In this sense, Erdogan supporters 
have recognized his hateful rhetoric was a call to action against the “others” (i.e., Gulenists), and have 
become willing to comply by committing wilful acts of violence (Benesch et al. 2020). 
 
Also shown, hate crimes incited by politically charged hate speech have reached a dangerous level, such 
that the victims have been forced to leave their country or otherwise distance themselves from society. 
This is due to the fear of further victimization as well as losing a sense of belonging to country—both of 
which were the unbearable outcomes of strategic exclusion and demonization against members of the 
Gulen Movement. The social and historical realities of Turkish society highlighted in this study stress that 
instances of victimization have been common throughout different historical periods, although the actors 
and political ideologies involved. The findings indicate that similar to the vilification campaigns previously 
imposed against Armenians, Kurds, and Alawites in Turkey, ordinary people joined the war against the 
Gulen Movement, waged, motivated, and encouraged entirely by those in power. 
 
Further, the study examined the repercussions of hate speech and hate crimes against the Movement, and 
the effects on members’ daily life practices and social interactions. Similar to previous research on hate 
crime victimization (see Bell and Perry 2015; Perry and Alvi 2012), the survey and interview findings 
indicated that the victims made significant changes in their lives due to the fear of further persecution and 
deliberately alienated themselves from society. These changes included moving to another neighborhood 
or city, fleeing to another country, changing daily routines, avoiding certain places at certain times and 
attending group activities, and adopting more personal security measures. This alienation and willingness 
to reconfigure daily life persisted even after migrating to a foreign country, with some respondents 
preferring not to contact other non-Movement members of the Turkish diaspora. 
 
Another effect of hate crime victimization was the disappearance of opportunities to express and defend 
oneself. Participants recounted how they avoided disclosing their identity and experiences not only to 
ordinary people, but also to the criminal justice system because they thought they would be further 
victimized. Indeed, these changes in social interaction and behavior among victim groups due to the in 
terrorem effects of hate crimes—that being the intimidation of a group through the victimization of one or 
a few members (Weinstein 1992)—were also noted in previous research. In particular, Perry and Alvi 
(2012) concluded from surveys and focus groups among seven vulnerable communities in Ontario, 
Canada, that hate crime victims adopt various strategies to cope with their vulnerability through changes 
in behavioral patterns and routine activities. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study explored the rising hate crimes inflicted against Gulen Movement members in Turkey since 
2013, and the potential triggering effect of political hate speech. Through surveys and interviews with 
victims of hate crimes, the findings suggest that participants’ victimization experiences increased 
significantly in tandem with rising anti-Movement rhetoric in Turkey. This was particularly prevalent after 
corruption probes were conducted against some cabinet ministers and top government officials in 2013, 
and following an attempted coup in 2016. Further analysis of victims’ responses suggested that the 
perpetrators might have been motivated by denouncements from Turkish President Erdogan and other 
government officials against group members. The findings also suggest that the rising hate speech and hate 
crimes carried out against the Movement had devastating effects on participants’ daily life practices and 
social interactions. 
 
This study has partially explained the triggering effect of political hate speech on perpetrators through 
victims’ perspectives. However, this poses a limitation, in that victims’ assumptions regarding the 
motivation to commit hate crimes might not tell a whole story. To better understand how this mechanism 
works, future studies can investigate offenders’ accounts through interviews and by examining court 
documents if these hate crimes are investigated in the future. 
 
That said, the findings can inform policies that will prevent or decrease future hate crime victimization at 
both national and international levels. International bodies such as the United Nations and the European 
Union can call upon governments of their member states to more effectively fight against political hate 
speech and urge them to refrain from using loaded language that incites violence against dissident groups 
in their countries. Besides this, citizens should be better educated to critically decode the messages 
transmitted by politicians and act responsibly without resorting to violence. Most importantly, in line with 
Perry’s (2001: 227) suggestion, we recommend that political parties and members of civil society develop 
a positive rhetoric of difference to temper “the flames of hatred” fueled by government voices. Indeed, the 
line between freedom of speech and hate speech that potentially motivates violent actions should be 
defined more clearly in the literature and within the context of criminal law so that the inflammatory 
discourse used by politicians can be eliminated or further reduced. 
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